Social memory theory is therefore only one recent approach to the historical
Jesus to assert (1) that historical Jesus research properly consists of scholarly
narration of what could have been, not an attaininment of what necessarily was,
and (2) that scholars should begin the process of hypothesizing the historical
Jesus by explaining how early Christians came to think what they did about him
instead of dismissing those thoughts.
My
claim is that they share an undergirding conviction that historical Jesus scholar-
ship does not fundamentally need to escape the interpretive work of the gospel
authors but rather work with it and ‘account for it sensibly’ (Allison 2010: 21).28
Accounting for early Christian interpretations of Jesus sensibly does not mean,
for Allison, Schröter, myself or any of these other scholars (to my knowledge),
conflating those interpretations with the historical Jesus.29 It means that scholarly
conclusions about the historical Jesus and (in)accuracy of the gospels must arise
out of this larger process of constructing how early Christianity came to be in
light of our current knowledge about it.
In a later publication, he even claims that their ‘inauthentic’ views might
be due to Jesus: ‘Jesus himself, his history and personality, imposed and forced
this method of presentation upon the bearers of the first tradition and the gospel
writers’ (1969: 76). This is a fairly fascinating line of thought on the part of
Bornkamm, one that deserves to be highlighted – ‘Jesus himself’ may be respon-
sible for producing the interpretive categories of the early Christians that pro-
hibit the consideration of traditions reflecting those categories as historical Jesus
material according to ‘criticism’. Clearly, this type of continuity between Jesus
and the gospel authors is precisely what his earlier statements about ‘authentic-
ity’ and ‘inauthenticity’ preclude, and he knows this.
Hahn speaks substantially
less of testing the authenticity of individual units of tradition and substantially
more of explaining how early Christians came to interpret Jesus in the ways that
they did as a ‘process of reception’, eventually giving way to a nascent theory of
historical Jesus research as tracing the reception of Jesus and Jesus tradition.35
As he notes – and this is a crucial difference between the criteria approach and
more recent approaches such as the memory approach – this scholarly endeavor
does not lead directly to the historical Jesus, but rather to a context in which
answers about him can be formulated:
As we strive to deal with all this in connection with the process of reception, the
historical investigation of Jesus must in no way be curtailed; but it will be given an
orientation which not only does justice to the New Testament, but also allows many
elements in the history of Jesus to be seen more clearly (Hahn 1983: 80).
Reception of Jesus by early followers are based on their present beliefs and categories. Any creation of myth by authors are also due to their present needs and in someway permitted by original impression of Jesus.
ostmodern historiography in its various
shapes and sizes has demonstrated that what Hahn and Bornkamm conceptualized
as an inferior back door or ‘other path’ to the discussion is, in reality, the only point
of entry. If an ‘authentic’ historical Jesus ‘behind’ the gospels and ‘free from all
post-resurrection conceptions’ (Hahn 1983: 45) is impossible for historians to
attain – and it is – the quest can and must proceed by hypothesizing the historical
Jesus in light of so-called ‘inauthentic’ tradition.37 As Le Donne has convincingly
demonstrated, however, this should not be lamented but embraced as the manner
in which scholarly speculation about an irrecoverable past must necessarily always
occur (2011a; similarly Crossley 2015: 44).
I have, for example, found the notion that early
Christians could have been embarrassed about various issues concerning Jesus to
be useful in narrating a possible historical development (Keith 2011a: 169 n. 16;
2012: 48 n. 93; 2014: 91-98). The important point, however, is that I do not
believe the concept of early Christian embarrassment to be a means of dispens-
ing with Christian interpretations and directly accessing the actual past; the his-
torian has work yet to do even if Christians were embarrassed about something.
Crossley has recently made the same point: ‘If a saying or deed is embarrassing,
why does it have to be Jesus who created the embarrassing moment? Why not
someone else earlier in the tradition? Or, that which is embarrassing to one need
not necessarily be embarrassing to another’ (2015: 39). Thus, ‘embarrassment’
cannot function as a criterion to yield directly ‘authenticity’; it can only point
historians toward the types of phenomena for which they must account, while
leaving the manner in which they account for them open to scholarly
argumentation.38
In this article, I have argued that at least two current debates reflect competing
models for how to conduct historical Jesus research. The first model, which came
to a particularly forceful and lasting expression in the period of Bultmann and his
followers and assumed form criticism’s understanding of the transmission of the
Jesus tradition, views the historian’s task as building a historical Jesus from indi-
vidual units of gospel tradition that have been broken from the narratives of the
written gospels. In this model, the kerygmatic narratives of the gospels are a hin-
drance that scholars must get ‘behind’ in order to reach the historical Jesus. The
second model, which has come to a particularly forceful expression in the work of
scholars employing social memory theory or postmodern theories of history,
views the historian’s task as proposing a historical narrative that explains how
early Christians came to conceptualize Jesus in the ways that they did and gener-
ates theories of the historical Jesus on the basis of that process. In this model, the
narratives of the gospels are an indispensable aid that scholars must embrace as
the primary means by which one can discuss an unattainable actual past.
I have furthermore argued that only the second model for historical Jesus
research is feasible. I have done so by noting how each model builds respectively
from differing theories of the transmission of the Jesus tradition, which necessar-
ily lead them to differing convictions about what a historian can know and what
his or her task is. Despite the efforts of several scholars to integrate these two
models, in my judgment they are incompatible at the levels of method and epis-
temology. As Bornkamm and Hahn rightly observed, these differences are most
clear in considering the role that continuity between Jesus and the kerygmatic
narratives of the gospels plays in historical Jesus research.
Jesus to assert (1) that historical Jesus research properly consists of scholarly
narration of what could have been, not an attaininment of what necessarily was,
and (2) that scholars should begin the process of hypothesizing the historical
Jesus by explaining how early Christians came to think what they did about him
instead of dismissing those thoughts.
My
claim is that they share an undergirding conviction that historical Jesus scholar-
ship does not fundamentally need to escape the interpretive work of the gospel
authors but rather work with it and ‘account for it sensibly’ (Allison 2010: 21).28
Accounting for early Christian interpretations of Jesus sensibly does not mean,
for Allison, Schröter, myself or any of these other scholars (to my knowledge),
conflating those interpretations with the historical Jesus.29 It means that scholarly
conclusions about the historical Jesus and (in)accuracy of the gospels must arise
out of this larger process of constructing how early Christianity came to be in
light of our current knowledge about it.
In a later publication, he even claims that their ‘inauthentic’ views might
be due to Jesus: ‘Jesus himself, his history and personality, imposed and forced
this method of presentation upon the bearers of the first tradition and the gospel
writers’ (1969: 76). This is a fairly fascinating line of thought on the part of
Bornkamm, one that deserves to be highlighted – ‘Jesus himself’ may be respon-
sible for producing the interpretive categories of the early Christians that pro-
hibit the consideration of traditions reflecting those categories as historical Jesus
material according to ‘criticism’. Clearly, this type of continuity between Jesus
and the gospel authors is precisely what his earlier statements about ‘authentic-
ity’ and ‘inauthenticity’ preclude, and he knows this.
Hahn speaks substantially
less of testing the authenticity of individual units of tradition and substantially
more of explaining how early Christians came to interpret Jesus in the ways that
they did as a ‘process of reception’, eventually giving way to a nascent theory of
historical Jesus research as tracing the reception of Jesus and Jesus tradition.35
As he notes – and this is a crucial difference between the criteria approach and
more recent approaches such as the memory approach – this scholarly endeavor
does not lead directly to the historical Jesus, but rather to a context in which
answers about him can be formulated:
As we strive to deal with all this in connection with the process of reception, the
historical investigation of Jesus must in no way be curtailed; but it will be given an
orientation which not only does justice to the New Testament, but also allows many
elements in the history of Jesus to be seen more clearly (Hahn 1983: 80).
Reception of Jesus by early followers are based on their present beliefs and categories. Any creation of myth by authors are also due to their present needs and in someway permitted by original impression of Jesus.
ostmodern historiography in its various
shapes and sizes has demonstrated that what Hahn and Bornkamm conceptualized
as an inferior back door or ‘other path’ to the discussion is, in reality, the only point
of entry. If an ‘authentic’ historical Jesus ‘behind’ the gospels and ‘free from all
post-resurrection conceptions’ (Hahn 1983: 45) is impossible for historians to
attain – and it is – the quest can and must proceed by hypothesizing the historical
Jesus in light of so-called ‘inauthentic’ tradition.37 As Le Donne has convincingly
demonstrated, however, this should not be lamented but embraced as the manner
in which scholarly speculation about an irrecoverable past must necessarily always
occur (2011a; similarly Crossley 2015: 44).
I have, for example, found the notion that early
Christians could have been embarrassed about various issues concerning Jesus to
be useful in narrating a possible historical development (Keith 2011a: 169 n. 16;
2012: 48 n. 93; 2014: 91-98). The important point, however, is that I do not
believe the concept of early Christian embarrassment to be a means of dispens-
ing with Christian interpretations and directly accessing the actual past; the his-
torian has work yet to do even if Christians were embarrassed about something.
Crossley has recently made the same point: ‘If a saying or deed is embarrassing,
why does it have to be Jesus who created the embarrassing moment? Why not
someone else earlier in the tradition? Or, that which is embarrassing to one need
not necessarily be embarrassing to another’ (2015: 39). Thus, ‘embarrassment’
cannot function as a criterion to yield directly ‘authenticity’; it can only point
historians toward the types of phenomena for which they must account, while
leaving the manner in which they account for them open to scholarly
argumentation.38
In this article, I have argued that at least two current debates reflect competing
models for how to conduct historical Jesus research. The first model, which came
to a particularly forceful and lasting expression in the period of Bultmann and his
followers and assumed form criticism’s understanding of the transmission of the
Jesus tradition, views the historian’s task as building a historical Jesus from indi-
vidual units of gospel tradition that have been broken from the narratives of the
written gospels. In this model, the kerygmatic narratives of the gospels are a hin-
drance that scholars must get ‘behind’ in order to reach the historical Jesus. The
second model, which has come to a particularly forceful expression in the work of
scholars employing social memory theory or postmodern theories of history,
views the historian’s task as proposing a historical narrative that explains how
early Christians came to conceptualize Jesus in the ways that they did and gener-
ates theories of the historical Jesus on the basis of that process. In this model, the
narratives of the gospels are an indispensable aid that scholars must embrace as
the primary means by which one can discuss an unattainable actual past.
I have furthermore argued that only the second model for historical Jesus
research is feasible. I have done so by noting how each model builds respectively
from differing theories of the transmission of the Jesus tradition, which necessar-
ily lead them to differing convictions about what a historian can know and what
his or her task is. Despite the efforts of several scholars to integrate these two
models, in my judgment they are incompatible at the levels of method and epis-
temology. As Bornkamm and Hahn rightly observed, these differences are most
clear in considering the role that continuity between Jesus and the kerygmatic
narratives of the gospels plays in historical Jesus research.
